In this study we analysed the relationship between damage in the territory of the posterior cerebral artery and semantic knowledge, with special reference to category dissociations. Twenty-eight posterior cerebral artery stroke patients (18 left, 8 right and 2 bilateral posterior cerebral artery infarctions) completed a neuropsychological battery aimed at assessing semantic knowledge. The battery included picture naming, word-picture matching, a verbal semantic questionnaire and a picture reality decision task. For each participant, the lesion was reconstructed on the basis of MRI images, and was classified according to the involvement of the areas supplied by posterior cerebral artery. Defective naming scores were observed in 12 of 18 left posterior cerebral artery cases (67%), four of eight right posterior cerebral artery cases (50%), and one of two bilateral posterior cerebral artery cases (50%). Only in the bilateral posterior cerebral artery lesion case did we observe the pattern expected in pure visual agnosia, i.e. poor picture naming, poor picture reality decision, and normal verbal semantic questionnaire. Nine left posterior cerebral artery cases and two right posterior cerebral artery cases presented with poor performance on both the picture naming task and the verbal semantic questionnaire, thus suggesting semantic impairment. For 5 of the 12 left posterior cerebral artery patients who fared poorly on the naming task, biological stimuli (overall) were significantly more impaired than artifacts. In three of these five subjects, performance on plant-life stimuli was significantly less accurate than that on animals. A further left posterior cerebral artery patient presented a disproportionate impairment on plant-life stimuli only on the word-picture matching and on the questionnaire. The patterns of performance in these subjects suggest that the observed dissociations originated at the semantic level. Among left posterior cerebral artery patients, a naming deficit only occurred when damage to the fusiform gyrus extended anterior to Talairach's y-coordinate -50, and a disproportionate impairment of biological categories only when the lesion extended anterior to y = À32.5. Results show that the semantic deficit for the category of plant life is a genuine cognitive pattern, and does not depend on loss of colour knowledge. The contrast of left posterior cerebral artery strokes and herpes simplex encephalitis cases shows that the neural substrates for the semantic representation of plant life and animals are, at least in part, distinct. Middle and posterior portions of the left fusiform are crucial for the representation of plant-life knowledge, whereas left anterior temporal areas are more crucial than left posterior and basal temporal areas for the representation of knowledge about animals.
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Introduction
This study investigates the relationships between posterior cerebral artery (PCA) infarctions and semantic memory disorders, with special reference to semantic category dissociations. The basic reason for undertaking this project is that the anatomical counterpart of category-specific disorders is not yet clear. The most frequently reported dissociation consists of a disproportionate impairment of knowledge about biological categories compared to artefacts: of the 79 cases of semantic-category dissociations reported in the systematic review by Capitani et al. (2003) , 61 (77%) presented with disproportionate damage to biological categories. This dissociation is interesting both for its quantitative prevalence, and because it is very frequently associated with damage to neural structures supplied by the PCA. As reported by Capitani et al. (2003) , basal temporal regions were affected in most of these 61 cases, due to Herpes Simplex Encephalitis (HSE) (46%), head trauma (16%), degenerative disease (16%) or other causes. Even though there were only three (5%) PCA infarctions in this series, PCA strokes are of great interest from the point of view of lesion localization. In fact, HSE, degenerative cortical diseases and head injury usually give rise to poorly demarcated, often diffuse and bilateral lesions that reduce the opportunity for fine-grained localization. On the contrary, lesions associated to PCA infarcts generally have clearly recognizable boundaries and are mostly unilateral.
Another reason for investigating a condition that is likely to yield category-specific semantic deficits is that it is not entirely clear whether disproportionate damage to biological categories is a specific cognitive pattern or simply the consequence of a greater fragility of these categories. This latter possibility must be entertained, as in the literature disproportionate impairments of biological categories are more frequent than other categorical dissociations. When evaluating the factors that may underlie categorical dissociations, two principles must be clearly distinguished: (i) the differential fragility of a categorical domain and (ii) the lack of a localized and specific neural substrate for a categorical domain. The fragility principle predicts that, given a process causing random lesions, fragile functions should be disrupted more frequently than robust functions. Capitani et al. (2003) identified 61 reliable reports of disproportionate impairments of biological categories over artefacts, and only 18 reports of the opposite dissociation. At face value, this fact is consistent with the claim that biological categories are more 'fragile'. (We will not consider here the alternative account that by chance cerebral lesions affect the neural substrate of biological categories more frequently than that of artefacts.) However, even if one was willing to acknowledge differential fragility, this would by no means amount to endorsing the view that biological categories are not localizable in the brain. The non-localization principle predicts that a given dissociation should occur independent of lesion site, and area more frequently associated with a category dissociation should simply reflect the frequency with which a given area is damaged in neurological patients. Therefore, since stroke is vastly more frequent than HSE, disproportionate damage to biological categories should be observed more frequently in stroke patients than in HSE patients. By the same token, since middle cerebral artery (MCA) strokes are more frequent than PCA strokes, disproportionate damage to biological categories should occur more frequently following MCA strokes than PCA strokes. The occurrence of selective damage to biological categories following stroke and HSE in the review by Capitani et al. (2003) is shown in Table 1 . Of 61 cases with impairment of biological categories, 45.9% were affected by HSE and only 8.2% by stroke. In contrast, 55.6% of the cases with damage to artefacts had a stroke, and 5.6% had HSE. The relative incidence of stroke and of HSE was significantly different between the two dissociation groups ( 2 = 21.073, df = 1, P50.0001). Among the five stroke cases, three subjects with disproportionate damage to biological categories suffered from PCA infarction and two from MCA infarction, whereas 10/10 cases of artefacts impairment following stroke had damage to the MCA. Also this disproportion was significant (Fisher's exact test, P = 0.022). These data strongly suggest that among biological category cases, both aetiology and lesion site significantly depart from the predictions based on the non-localization principle, as selective impairment of biological categories often occurs following two relatively rare conditions (HSE and PCA stroke), both affecting the basal temporal regions. A further reason for investigating semantic memory in PCA patients are two interesting reports published after the review by Capitani et al. (2003) . Cases RS (Samson and Pillon, 2003) and FAV (Crutch and Warrington, 2003) suffered from left PCA strokes and presented with a semantic category dissociation that disproportionately impaired knowledge of plant-life items, a subcategory of biological entities, while significantly sparing knowledge about animals. These are not the only reports of a semantic deficit restricted to plant-life knowledge. A review by Laiacona (2006) found 11 single-case reports with a disproportionate plant-life impairment: five of these (45%) had suffered a left PCA infarction, whereas only two (18%) had HSE. Thus, even though data on animals and plant life are described separately only in a minority of the 61 cases reviewed by Capitani et al. (2003) , PCA patients seem more likely to suffer from a semantic deficit for biological categories disproportionately severe for plant-life items, than subjects with HSE or head trauma. It is worth stressing that PCA lesions overlap only in part with the lesions typically caused by HSE or traumatic brain injury. PCA stroke lesions typically affect structures located more posteriorly in the temporal lobe than those damaged by HSE and head trauma, with a possible overlap in the intermediate basal temporal areas. Furthermore, HSE and traumatic brain injury often affect the temporal pole, which is spared by PCA infarcts because its blood supply is provided by the middle cerebral artery. Other areas often damaged in HSE but spared in PCA strokes include the inferior and middle temporal gyri, the uncus, the anterior third of the hippocampus, and the amygdala. In other words, the difference in the rate of occurrence of various semantic-category dissociations across different diseases might be rooted in the distinction of the anatomical substrates affected. Left PCA strokes might more selectively disrupt plant life because knowledge about animals is represented bilaterally, and therefore is more liable to suffer from the bilateral lesions associated to HSE or trauma, and/or because the areas hosting plant-life representation are more posterior than those hosting animal representation. The association between left PCA infarct and plant-life deficits was suggested by Gainotti (2000) , who pointed out that these category effects were mild. In his review, Gainotti proposed that unilateral lesions were more likely to cause lexical deficits, whereas semantic deficits would be typically associated to bilateral lesions. He also noted that, among cases with lexical deficit, plants, fruits and vegetables were usually more affected than animals.
The above clinical considerations suggest that left PCA infarctions may cause a disproportionate impairment for biological categories, most severe for plant-life knowledge. However, there have been no systematic attempts to find which structures, among those supplied by the PCA, are most specifically associated to this deficit. According to Capitani et al. (2003) localization was often approximate, and Gainotti (2005) classified lesions into three broad groups (anterior temporal, temporal-occipital and more dorsal lesions).
Functional neuroimaging is a potential source of methodologically sound data on this issue, as it allows excellent anatomical localization and relies on replicable experiments carried out on normal subjects with complex and exacting tasks. However, the neuroimaging data reported in the literature do not provide a definite answer to the above questions. In the first place, available results are not entirely consistent. Some studies have failed to demonstrate relevant distinctions between biological categories and artefacts. In a review of functional neuroimaging studies published up to 2000, mainly based on PET scanning, Price and Friston (2002) concluded that 'there are no areas that were consistently more active for natural kinds relative to man-made objects' and that '. . . the results offer no support for any theory proposing specific neural processing at a semantic processing level for natural kinds of objects', although activation was consistently observed in the left posterior middle temporal cortex when objects or words corresponded to tools. More recently, some authors found that living and non-living items activated a common left-lateralized network including the left fusiform and superior and middle temporal gyri, in the absence of category-or domain-specific activation (Tyler et al., 2003 ; see also a discussion in Taylor et al., 2007) . In fact, Tyler et al. (2003) reported additional activation for animals in the right occipital cortex, that they attributed to 'the extra visual processing demands required in order to differentiate one animal from another' (for a different interpretation of these data, see Martin and Caramazza, 2003) .
At variance with the negative conclusions reported above, other studies have argued for a specific role of the fusiform gyrus in the semantic representation of biological and man-made categories. Martin and Caramazza (2003) suggested that 'biological objects (faces, animals) typically show peak activity in the lateral portion of the fusiform gyrus, whereas the peak for artefacts (tools) is typically located in the medial portion of the fusiform. Ventral occipital regions (especially the inferior occipital gyrus) typically respond more strongly to biological objects (faces, animals) than to artefacts. However, activity associated with each object category is not confined to a specific location, but may cover a broad expanse of occipito-temporal cortex. In addition, each 'categoryspecific' region in the ventral temporal cortex (e.g. the fusiform face area) also responds, to a lesser extent, to other object categories'. An updated presentation of the data that form the basis for these conclusions is found in Martin (2007a, b) . Martin and his associates also proposed that motion-related information is crucial for the representation of certain categories of objects. Biological motion activates structures in the left superior temporal sulcus, whereas mechanical motion elicits a greater hemodynamic response in the posterior portion of the middle temporal gyrus and of the inferior temporal sulcus on the left (Beauchamp et al., 2002 (Beauchamp et al., , 2003 .
On the whole, the literature on functional imaging does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the clinical data. Leaving aside the contrasting reports, the most consistent findings would locate the neural representation of animals and artefacts in the lateral and medial halves of the fusiform gyrus, respectively, with, in addition, a strong activation of the middle temporal gyrus due to motion processing for both animals and tools. In neurological cases, however, lesions associated to a disproportionate biological categories impairment (at least in relation to HSE) are almost never so selective as to affect only the lateral fusiform gyrus. Therefore, it is worth collecting finer-grained anatomical details in subjects with neurological damage in critical regions. In this respect, PCA infarcts are very promising, because they cause well-demarcated and sometimes rather selective lesions. In this study we analysed a consecutive series of subjects with unilateral and bilateral PCA infarcts. The advantage of studying a continuous sample is that it allows, in principle, to report also cases (if any) with a crucial lesion but without the expected neuropsychological picture. 
Subjects and methods

Participants
Neuropsychological assessment
All subjects completed a neuropsychological examination aimed at assessing semantic knowledge. The core battery included four tests: picture naming, pointing to pictures on verbal command, a semantic memory questionnaire and a visual reality decision test. All tests used the same 60 stimuli from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart set (Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980) . There were 10 items each for the three biological categories (animals, fruit and vegetables) and three artefacts categories (tools, vehicles and pieces of furniture). In the semantic questionnaire, there were six questions for each item, tapping different levels of knowledge: superordinate, subordinate perceptual and subordinate associative. In the reality decision test (Barbarotto et al., 2002) , 30 unreal biological items and 30 unreal artefacts (obtained by assembling halves of two real pictures) were included. Details on these tests are reported in Laiacona et al. (2006) . Tests are also described in the supplementary material.
For picture naming, word-picture matching and for the questionnaire, we considered a fully defective performance as scores lower than the worst score found in a sample of 60 normal elders with low education (mean years of schooling = 6.2, range 5-8) by . Scores between the 5th percentile and the worst score of the same control sample were rated as marginally defective. In these three tests at least one control subject attained the highest possible score; therefore, the score range observed in the control sample included the lowest marginally defective score at one extreme and flawless performance at the other.
For the visual reality decision test, normative data were calculated taking into account the performance of 140 controls (age range 18-84 years). Pathology and normality thresholds were fixed on the basis of one-sided outer-and inner non-parametric tolerance limits (Barbarotto et al., 2002) .
Statistical methods
Data were examined according to a multiple single-case approach. The responses given by each participant in each test underwent a logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable was the response given by the patient, coded 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect). The model included both categorical and continuous variables. Categorical variables were the classification of each item as 'artefact' or 'biological' (and, within the latter, as animal or plant-life items) or the type of question asked in the questionnaire (superordinate, perceptual, etc.), or the real/ unreal nature of the stimuli included in the reality judgment task. Continuous variables typical of each stimulus were word frequency, familiarity, prototypicality, difficulty coefficients and, for naming and word-picture matching, some indices typical of each picture (name agreement, visual complexity and image agreement). For each task, we analysed the significance of the effects within linear models that always included a difficulty coefficient at the stimulus level, derived from the performance of a group of elderly controls. For the questionnaire we introduced an additional coefficient, based on a question difficulty rating given by a group of young and well-educated raters. Interrelations between the categorical variables were studied as interactions. Comparisons were performed after co-varying for the nuisance variables. Analyses were carried out using GLIM, release 3.7 (Aitkin et al., 1990) , and results of each comparison are expressed as chi-square points with 1 degree of freedom. The hypotheses were considered bi-directional unless explicitly stated.
As our experiment considered three basic categorical domains (artefacts and biological stimuli, the latter further divided in animals and plant life), we were able to answer two independent and hierarchical statistical questions: (i) are biological categories different from artefacts?; and (ii) within biological categories, are animals different from plant life? The available statistical methods did not permit multiple comparisons between all subsets of these three categorical domains, therefore, no formal comparisons were attempted between artefacts and animals and artefacts and plant life.
Lesion mapping
All participants underwent a MRI study, with the exception of four cases (see below) for whom only good-quality CT-scan data were available. For all the subjects with MRI documentation, damage was reconstructed in detail (see list below) based on the anatomical labels of Nieuwenhuis et al. (1978) . In parenthesis we report the labels used for the same structures by Mai et al. (2004) , and the corresponding abbreviations. In each hemisphere, we checked for damage to the following structures: Given the putatively crucial role of the fusiform gyrus suggested by the functional neuroimaging literature, and the conspicuous anteroposterior extent of this structure, whenever the lesion affected the fusiform gyrus we quantified the antero-posterior extent of damage, mostly on the basis of coronal sections with reference to Talairach coordinates (Mai et al., 2004) , adopting 5 mm intervals. The correspondence between MRI images and Talairach coordinates was determined in each case by systematically comparing MRI images to the diagrams in Mai et al., and taking other cerebral landmarks as a reference. In particular, the posterior margin of the pulvinar corresponded to Talairach's y coordinate -35 and the posterior margin of the corpus callosum corresponded to y = -45. The posterior limit of the fusiform corresponded to y = -72. In Mai et al.'s atlas the brain structures posterior to the anterior commissure are assigned positive values, and the same points correspond to negative values in the Talairach space. In this study we retain the Talairach notation, so that larger negative numbers along the antero-posterior axis indicate more posterior locations along the same axis.
Lesions were mapped by two of the authors (E.C and M.L.) and their classification was then blind-checked by two other authors (G.M. and R.C.). Table 2 shows the main demographic characteristics of the 28 subjects, the structures damaged in each case and naming performance (overall, and separately for biological categories and artefacts).
Results
Eighteen subjects presented lesions in the left PCA territory (64%); eight subjects with damage to the right PCA (29%) and two with bilateral PCA lesions (7%). Interval from stroke to assessment ranged from 3 days to 10 years. There were more males than females, i.e. 19 of 28 participants (68%) were males. The same pattern is reported in the studies on PCA strokes by Castaigne et al. (1973 ), De Renzi et al. (1987 , and Yamamoto et al. (1999) , in which 46 of 79 (58%), 13 of 16 (81%) and 33 of 44 (75%) participants were males, respectively.
Fusiform damage was detected in 19 of 28 subjects (68%): 15 of 18 cases with left PCA damage (83%); two of eight cases with right PCA lesions (25%); two of two subjects with bilateral PCA strokes (100%). It occurred significantly more often among left that among right lesions (Fisher's exact test P = 0.008).
Picture naming and the other tasks of the semantic battery
On the picture naming test, pathological scores were observed in 12 of 18 left PCA cases (67%); in 4 of 8 right PCA subjects (50%); and in 1 of 2 bilateral PCA patients (50%). For these subjects the naming impairment concerned the overall score (60 stimuli) and at least one categorical domain. These results are summarized in Table 2 .
Picture naming deficits, however, may result from the disruption of different cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, to establish the nature of the deficit, we analysed performance on the four experimental tasks for the 17 PCA subjects (12 left, 4 right, 1 bilateral) with poor naming (Table 3) .
Left PCA cases (n = 12)
Eight left PCA cases with fully defective naming (AAL, AMA, AMO, AUM, CCA, EDB, RPE, SGE) also fared poorly on the semantic questionnaire. Since the latter is a purely verbal task that does not require processing of visual information, the deficit in these subjects must include a lexical-semantic component. Establishing the origin of the cognitive deficit was less straightforward for the remaining four left PCA patients.
Case WMA was impaired only on plant-life naming, so that his overall naming of biological categories was only marginally defective. His performance on biological categories was within the norm in the word-picture matching and reality decision tasks. This pattern would be consistent with a purely lexical deficit. However, WMA could not complete the semantic questionnaire, and as this task provided the most sensitive and specific measure of semantic damage in our battery, a mild semantic impairment cannot be ruled out in his case (see online supplementary material).
Case GIZ showed some impairment of biological categories in all tasks. Naming was still within normal limits when collapsing across biological stimuli, but fell under the norm when plant-life stimuli were considered separately. There was a clear deficit for fruit and vegetables on word-picture matching, and a less severe impairment for both animals and plant life in the semantic questionnaire. Artefacts were marginally impaired, and only in word-picture matching. Reality decision was normal for all categories. Thus, this subject's profile is consistent with loss of semantic knowledge, disproportionately affecting biological categories as compared with inanimate objects.
The findings in PG and BOR were more difficult to interpret. Case PG showed a very mild and inconsistent impairment. He was marginally defective with plant-life stimuli on naming, and with biological stimuli on the semantic questionnaire (collapsing across animals and plant life); however, on the word-picture matching task he was marginally defective only with artefacts. Case BOR was marginally impaired in naming artefacts and animals immediately post-onset, but her performance quickly reverted to normal. We feel unable to draw reliable conclusions for these two subjects.
In summary, the pattern of performance of 9 of 12 left PCA cases (AAL, AMA, AMO, AUM, CCA, EDB, GIZ, RPE and SGE) was consistent with semantic damage. Although the same conclusion is not granted for case WMA (the only subject who did not complete the semantic questionnaire), a semantic deficit is also likely in this subject (see supplementary material), alternative accounts being a lexical deficit or a disconnection between lexicon and the semantic system, but not visual agnosia. In three cases (AUM, CCA, RPE), as shown in Table 4 , superordinate information was relatively preserved. A significant effect of knowledge type (perceptual versus associative) was only observed in AMO, who showed relatively spared perceptual and impaired associative knowledge. None of the remaining cases even approached a significant difference in the opposite direction.
None of the 12 left PCA cases showed the pattern expected in pure visual agnosia, i.e. poor picture reality judgment and normal verbal semantic questionnaire. Nevertheless, picture reality judgment was defective in eight cases (AMO, AUM, CCA, EDB, PG, RPE, SGE and WMA), in whom an agnosic component may have added to the semantic deficit, to yield poor naming. BOR might have presented an agnosic component at the outset, but since she rapidly improved, a firm conclusion was not possible.
Right PCA cases (n = 4)
In contrast with the naming deficit of left PCA cases, whose performance on the remaining tasks was generally consistent with lexical-semantic damage, the pattern observed in the four right PCA subjects with poor naming does not allow the same conclusion (Table 3) . Findings were inconsistent across tasks and deficits on naming, on auditory word-picture matching and on the semantic questionnaire were never severe. The most reliable finding in this group was poor performance on the reality decision task. This suggests that an agnosic defect is a likely component of the naming deficit. In addition, GBO and VMA fared poorly on the semantic questionnaire. In this task, superordinate and subordinate information were equally available to both patients, and VMA fared worse with associative than perceptual probes. Fully defective performances are in bold and marginally defective performances are underlined (see text). A = animals; F&V = plant life; Cun = cuneus; LgG = lingual gyrus; PHG = parahippocampal gyrus; Hi = hippocampus; scc = callosal splenium; Thal = posterior thalamic nuclei; ITG = inferior temporal gyrus; OcG = occipital gyri; PCA = posterior cerebral artery. Unfortunately, since this task could not be administered to FMA and LCE, the sample was too small to allow firm conclusions on the incidence of semantic damage after right PCA infarction. Category dissociations were neither frequent nor consistent across tasks. Interestingly, none of these four cases presented with fusiform damage. Conversely, the two right PCA subjects with lesions involving the fusiform gyrus (AFI and GPA, Table 2 ) had normal naming scores, and therefore were not listed in Table 3 . These data would suggest that the right fusiform does not play a relevant role for the representation of semantic knowledge. However, strong conclusions are not warranted, as our sample included only two subjects with right fusiform involvement.
Bilateral PCA case (n = 1)
Naming was impaired for all categorical domains in VZA, a subject with bilateral involvement of the cuneus and of the fusiform gyrus (Tables 2 and 3 ). She presented with marked agnosic features (poor reality decision for all categories in the face of normal verbal semantic questionnaire) and mild impairment for biological stimuli on word-picture matching.
Categorical dissociations
Twelve left PCA cases For each subject we contrasted different semantic categories (Table 3 ). In 5 of the 12 PCA patients with poor naming, performance was significantly more impaired for biological stimuli than for artefacts (AMA, CCA, GIZ, RPE and WMA). Subjects AMA, CCA, GIZ and RPE showed the same dissociation also in wordpicture matching and/or in the semantic questionnaire (the latter task was not administered to WMA, but a semantic deficit is also likely in this subject). SGE did not show dissociated performance in picture naming, but fared significantly worse on biological stimuli than on artefacts in word-picture matching.
In four of the cases with disproportionate impairment of biological items (AMA, CCA, SGE and WMA), a further dissociation was found within the biological domain, as performance was significantly less accurate on plant-life stimuli than on animals. The dissociation concerned naming in three cases (AMA, CCA and WMA), word-picture matching in two cases (AMA and SGE) and the questionnaire in two cases (CCA and SGE). Thus, AMA, CCA and SGE presented a consistent dissociation between plant life and animals in more than one task. Disproportionate impairment of biological categories in both production (naming) and comprehension (word-picture matching and/or semantic questionnaire) clearly suggests that the nature of the impairment is semantic (Caramazza et al., 1990) . Categorical dissociations were never observed in the reality decision task, which suggests that an agnosic component was not responsible for the observed category effects, although it may have contributed aspecifically to the naming deficit.
Four right PCA cases
The four right PCA subjects impaired on naming contrast with the left PCA sample, as the search for category dissociation yielded either negative or inconsistent results (Table 3) . In case GBO, biological categories were significantly more impaired than artefacts, but only on the verbal questionnaire. Case FMA selectively failed when naming both artefacts and plant-life items, but named animals flawlessly. No significant dissociations were evident in LCE, even if her naming performance was defective only for artefacts. Case VMA was more impaired on artefacts than biological categories, but only in word-picture matching.
Visual reality judgements were pathological in all four right PCA cases with poor naming but, as in the left PCA group, no category dissociations were found.
One bilateral PCA case
Case VZA did not show consistent categorical dissociations (Table 3) . She was more impaired on biological categories (especially plant-life stimuli) but only in word-picture matching. She fared within normal limits on the semantic questionnaire, and did not show categorical dissociations in the reality decision task.
Overall conclusions
A clear category dissociation between biological items (impaired) and artefacts (preserved or relatively preserved) was documented in 6 of 18 subjects with left PCA damage. Five of them showed a dissociation on more than one task. Case WMA showed dissociated performance in naming, but did not complete the verbal questionnaire. In his case, dissociated performance on the latter task could only be predicted indirectly, by analogy with the performance of other subjects who showed similar performance in the other semantic task and completed the questionnaire (see supplementary material). In four of the six subjects, plant-life items were disproportionately impaired in comparison to animals, and in two, plant-life naming was damaged in the face of normal naming of animals. Figure 1 shows representative MRI images of the six subjects with category dissociations and lists the structures affected in each subject. Since images were selected to document fusiform damage, some of the structures affected in each subject may not be shown.
None of the subjects with right-sided or bilateral PCA damage showed a consistent categorical dissociation.
The role of the left fusiform gyrus
The role of the fusiform gyrus was investigated by analysing the relationship between naming accuracy and extent of the anatomical damage to this structure. The analysis was restricted to cases with left PCA damage as there were only two subjects with right fusiform damage (who, interestingly, scored normally on naming, see Table 2 ). In principle, it would be necessary to distinguish whether large lesions are detrimental due to their sheer volume, or because they are likely to encroach upon areas specifically responsible for a given deficit. These aspects could not be properly separated in our sample. In all cases, damage included the posterior end of the fusiform gyrus and extended uninterruptedly to the anterior border of the lesion. There were no instances in which spared and damaged portions of the fusiform gyrus alternated along the postero-anterior axis. It is to be hoped that an answer to this question will be provided by future studies comparing PCA strokes with different diseases (e.g. HSE), which typically affect distinct portions of the fusiform gyrus.
In the 18 subjects with left PCA damage, we analysed the relationship between naming accuracy and extent of fusiform damage (measured as the antero-posterior extent of the lesion in mm). None of the three PCA subjects without fusiform lesion (BOR, GGI and TSA) showed a reliable naming impairment (BOR presented a naming deficit immediately after the stroke, but recovered very quickly). A finer-grained study was carried out using a regression analysis based on MRI data. Since only CT information was available for case AMO, the approximate lesion extent was reconstructed on the basis of axial CT slices in this subject. In two cases, the anterior portion of the lesion affected only the medial half of the fusiform gyrus: case GIZ (mesial from y = -30 to y = -45 and whole from -45 to -72), and case WMA (mesial from y = -32.5 to y = -47.5 and whole from -47.5 to -72). For these two subjects, only half of the antero-posterior lesion extension was entered in the regression analysis for the part of the fusiform damage restricted to the medial aspect of the gyrus. For instance, in case GIZ the lesion extent considered in the regression analysis was (72 -45) = 27, plus (45 -30)/2 = 7.5, yielding a total lesion extent of (27 + 7.5) = 34.5.
The percentage of correct naming responses declined in proportion to increasing lesion size (Fig. 2) . The regression parameter expressing the overall percentage of correct naming given lesion size is b = -0.96 (SE = 0.16); the explained variance is 69.9% and the regression analysis yields an F-value of 37.113 (with df = 1.16, P50.0001).
The same pattern emerged when biological stimuli and artefacts are considered separately, but was particularly marked with biological stimuli (Fig. 3) , as the regression parameters become b = -1.09 (SE = 0.15) for biological stimuli and b = -0.84 (SE = 0.17) for artefacts, respectively. Lesion size explained 76.6% and 59.9% of the original variance, respectively. Naming accuracy declined more rapidly for biological stimuli than for artefacts as lesion size increased. The two regression models yielded F-values of 52.385 (with df = 1.16, P50.0001) and 23.866 (P = 0.0002). Figure 4 shows that the difference between correct naming of artefacts and biological stimuli increased as a function of the fusiform lesion size. At regression analysis, fusiform lesion size significantly predicted the discrepancy between naming accuracy for artefacts and for biological categories: F = 20.113, with df = 1.16, P = 0.0004, accounting for 55.7% of the original variance.
A final set of regression analyses were carried out considering animals and plant life separately. In both cases lesion extent was a significant predictor. For animal data, the regression parameter was b = -0.95 (SE = 0.21) and the variance explained by fusiform lesion size was 55.4%, yielding an F-value of 19.872 (df = 1.16, P = 0.0004). For plant-life data, the regression parameter was b = -1.16 (SE = 0.15), and the variance explained by fusiform lesion was 78.7%, yielding an F-value of 59.290 (P50.0001). This shows that the relationship between lesion size and naming impairment was stronger for plant life than for animals. However, in this case, lesion size failed to significantly predict the discrepancy between animals and plant life as only a non-significant trend in this direction was detected.
For the sake of functional localization within the fusiform gyrus, it may be interesting to look also at individual cases. Fifteen patients with left PCA stroke and fusiform damage are Table 2 ).
shown in Fig. 5 , no longer as points on a cartesian plane, but as bars showing the postero-anterior extent of the lesion. The three left PCA subjects without fusiform lesion (BOR, GGI and TSA) are not reported. Thus, Fig. 5 includes the 11 left PCA subjects with fusiform damage and naming impairment, and the four left PCA cases with fusiform damage and normal naming accuracy. The caption next to each bar indicates whether or not the subject was defective on all biological categories, only on animals, or only on plant-life items; and whether or not a dissociation between biological and inanimate categories or within biological categories was observed. Once again, we used Talairach coordinates for lesion classification on coronal slices. Lesions invariably affected the posterior end of the fusiform gyrus (located at y = -72), and extended to a various distance anterior to that coordinate. Figure 5 suggests the following considerations: (i) after unilateral left PCA stroke, fusiform damage extending anterior to y = -50 is necessary to result in a picture naming deficit. Accordingly, the four cases whose lesions lie posterior to y = -50 (BIM, GGA, MRO and PA) scored within the norm. In the 11 cases with impaired naming and fusiform lesion (AAL, AMA, AMO, AUM, CCA, EDB, GIZ, PG, RPE, SGE and WMA), fusiform damage extended anterior to y = -50; (ii) considering the 11 subjects above, all six cases with disproportionate impairment for biological categories (AMA, CCA, GIZ, RPE, SGE and WMA) suffered from lesions involving not only the posterior, but also the middle third of the fusiform gyrus, and extending anteriorly at least to y = -32.5. SGE did not show dissociation in naming, but since he did show a category dissociation in word-picture matching and in the verbal questionnaire, his performance is consistent with the pattern documented for the other cases; (iii) fusiform damage extending anteriorly to at least y = -32.5 is necessary, but not sufficient, to yield a semantic category dissociation. In the five subjects with naming impairment but without a category dissociation (AAL, AMO, AUM, EDB and SGE), biological categories were impaired but dissociations were not documented since artefacts were also affected; (iv) among PCA patients, the forward extent of the fusiform lesion predicts the discrepancy between biological categories and artefacts. However, extended fusiform lesions do not necessarily imply the occurrence of dissociations. Thus, subject AMA, who showed a significant dissociation, had smaller fusiform damage than subject EDB. These observations militate against the claim that semantic dissociations are a trivial phenomenon generated merely by lesion size.
Contrasting findings between PCA and HSE patients
As discussed above, most reported cases of disproportionate impairment for biological categories suffered from HSE. In these subjects, animals and plant life are generally damaged to a comparable degree. In contrast, the present study and analogous recent reports suggest that following left PCA stroke damage is more severe for plant life than for animals. Therefore, it is crucial to discuss the cognitive deficits that emerge from these two conditions in the light of their anatomical correlates. Should we conclude that the neural representation of plant-life semantics is located in middle and posterior regions of the left temporal lobe (often damaged by PCA strokes), whereas that of animal semantics relies more extensively on the temporal pole and on the more anterior temporal regions (often impaired by HSE)?
To verify this possibility, we should first rule out that disproportionate impairment of plant-life items merely corresponds to a severity effect. A disproportionate impairment of plant life over animals is reported with relative frequency (at least 15 cases so far, including those reported in this study), whereas selective impairment of animals is exceptional (only two reliable cases on record; Laiacona et al., 2006) . If plant-life knowledge were more vulnerable than animal knowledge, a mild deficit should impair only knowledge of plant life. To this end, we contrasted naming of the same animal and plant-life items in three PCA cases with a disproportionate deficit for plant life (AMA, CCA and WMA) and in two HSE cases, matched to PCA cases for overall naming performance on biological categories. The HSE cases matched with The blue line marks the anterior limit of lesions associated to normal performance; the red line correspond to the anterior limit beyond which patients may show a categorical dissociation. For cases GIZ and WMA the anterior part of the lesion, affecting only the medial half of the fusiform, is marked with a lighter shade of grey. For two patients (PG and GIZ) we report the percentage correct separately for A and F&V, because for both F&V was defective but animals and the overall performance with biological items was within the norm.
the PCA cases were LF (first and second examination, Laiacona et al., 1997) , and GG (Barbarotto et al., 1996) . HSE patients produced on average correct responses to 53.3% animals and 63.3% plant-life stimuli; PCA patients named correctly on average 83.3% animals and 36.7% plant-life items (supplementary material). On this basis, an overall effect of severity does not explain why plant-life items are more severely impaired following left PCA stroke. Turning back to the neural substrate of plant-life knowledge, it is relevant to quantify the backward extension of fusiform damage in the HSE patients whose semantic impairment affected the categories of animals and plant life to a comparable extent. Data were available for two such HSE cases: LF (Laiacona et al., 1997) and EA (Laiacona et al., 1993a (Laiacona et al., , 2005 . Representative MRI slices and behavioural results for these cases are reported in the supplementary material.
In the acute stage, LF demonstrated a semantic impairment for all biological categories. He correctly named 50% of the animals and 55% of plant-life items. After a few months, comparable recovery for both biological subcategories was observed (80% and 85% correct, respectively). The left fusiform was involved from its anterior tip to y = -45. MRI signal was altered in the affected areas, even though tissue loss was marginal. A very small right anterior temporal lesion was also present, extending from the pole to y = -25, and partially affecting the fusiform, but sparing the rest of the lobe.
Early after onset, case EA was dramatically impaired on picture naming for all categories, but on word-picture matching and on the questionnaire he presented a clear dissociation between biological categories (more impaired) and artefacts. Ten years later, his performance on the word-picture matching task and on the questionnaire had substantially recovered for animals, but remained unchanged for fruits and vegetables. Damage was almost entirely restricted to the left hemisphere, with extensive tissue loss and post-necrotic cysts. Fusiform damage extended backwards to about y = -50. There was only minimal involvement of the right temporal lobe.
In the acute stage, both HSE patients were impaired on both animal and plant-life knowledge, to a comparable extent. Their fusiform lesion extended backwards to involve the middle fusiform areas damaged in the PCA cases with a disproportionate impairment for plant life, although for the latter group anterior temporal areas were spared. This would support the hypothesis that middle-posterior fusiform is crucial for plant-life representation.
Discussion
Our main finding is that PCA strokes affecting the middle portion of the left fusiform gyrus are frequently associated with semantic damage. The impairment disproportionately affects biological categories, and frequently impairs knowledge of plant life more severely than knowledge of animals. The results obtained in this study are relevant to understanding the neural substrate of the semantic representation of biological categories, in particular that of plant life. They also contribute to the ongoing discussion on the cognitive nature of category specificity.
The neural substrate of biological categories
The impairment of biological categories generally derives from left-sided or bilateral temporal lobe lesions (Capitani et al., 2003) . In most reported cases, damage results from HSE and affects the polar, basal and mesial portions of the temporal lobe(s), in addition to the frontal orbito-basal regions and the insula (Kapur et al., 1994) . The present study and analogous recent reports provide evidence for the crucial role of left PCA strokes in disrupting knowledge related to biological categories. In the event of PCA strokes, plant life is the most severely impaired category (Samson and Pillon, 2003; Crutch and Warrington, 2003) .
As a first step in our analyses, we have ruled out that the different outcome of HSE and left PCA lesions is due to a bare severity effect, associated to greater fragility of plant-life representations. On this 'differential fragility' account, the more posterior temporal-occipital lesions resulting from left PCA stroke might disproportionately impair plant life not because they are posterior, but because they bear aspecific, milder effects that disrupt intrinsically more fragile plant-life representations to a greater extent than intrinsically more robust animal knowledge. However, even when PCA and HSE cases were matched for severity of their naming impairment for biological stimuli (see Results section and supplementary material), only the PCA group showed an advantage for animals over plant life.
Rather, the findings with PCA stroke patients suggest that middle fusiform lesions disproportionately impair plant life, whereas the anterior temporal lesions typical of HSE only exceptionally cause a disproportionate deficit for animals. Selective semantic damage for animals has been reported in stroke patient EW, who presented with a large area of encephalomalacia within the left frontal and parietal lobes a (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) . Presumably, the fusiform was not involved in this case. In HSE case KC (Blundo et al., 2006) correct picture naming performance on biological categories was 51 of 81 (63%), with 26 of 54 (48%) on animals and 25 of 27 (93%) on plant-life items. KC was severely impaired on animals, but scored within the norm on fruits and vegetables. MRI showed bilateral anterior temporal involvement. Damage was larger on the left, where it affected the pole and antero-inferior structures, than on the right, where it spared the pole and had lesser posterior extension. Unfortunately, published images do not permit defining the posterior extent of the lesion, nor establishing if and to what extent the fusiform was involved.
The data for LF and EA (see Results section), suggest that disproportionate impairment for animal knowledge may only be an occasional observation in HSE because lesions involve not only anterior temporal areas (crucial for the representation of animals) but also the middle part of the fusiform (crucial for plant-life representation) resulting in comparable damage to animals and plant-life knowledge. Detailed lesion descriptions of cases affected by a disproportionate impairment for animals and reports of cases affected only by a left anterior temporal lesion will establish whether or not this account is viable.
Case EA challenges the possibility that animals are represented only in the left anterior temporal lobe: how could animal knowledge recover after many years in this subject, given massive tissue loss in left anterior temporal lobe structures? A tentative hypothesis is that semantic knowledge about animals is not exclusively and permanently represented in anterior left temporal regions, but is represented also in other ancillary areas (possibly in the right temporal lobe). These areas would not suffice to grant sparing of this category immediately after acute damage, but might take over in long-term recovery following unilateral left-sided lesions. The observation that case KC (Blundo et al., 2006) , who presented a selective impairment for animals, suffered from bilateral temporal damage is in line with this possibility.
In conclusion, the middle and posterior parts of the left fusiform gyrus seem less crucial for representing knowledge about animals, whereas they are crucial for plant-life representation. This is consistent with the persisting semantic deficit for plant-life items many years after acute damage to the middle and posterior fusiform (10 years for case EA following HSE, 5 years for case CCA following a PCA stroke). In addition, our data suggest that a lesion limited to the right fusiform is not detrimental to the representation of biological categories by itself, because two subjects with large right fusiform lesions (ATI and GPA) fared normally on picture naming. However, our sample is too small to licence a strong position on this issue.
A caveat regarding the above conclusion is that lesions of the middle part of the fusiform gyrus also affect the neighbouring para-hippocampal gyrus (PHG). Therefore, the observed deficits might derive from damage to PHG (and not to the fusiform). The fusiform gyrus is a neocortical association area with definite connections to and from other sectors of the neocortex, and can be viewed as the substrate of long-term stored knowledge (e.g. on faces, colour, form, etc.). In contrast, PHG-even though it receives fast and direct connections from occipital neocortical areas (Wilson et al., 1983) -is phylogenetically older and structurally simpler than the fusiform. The literature demonstrates its involvement in navigation, place recognition, topographical learning, and in the encoding of object location (Epstein et al., 2007) , but the visual representations assembled by PHG seem to be view-point-specific (Epstein et al., 2003) -a feature that does not fit well with the more abstract level of representation typical of semantic information. On the whole, the fusiform gyrus seems a better candidate for serving as the substrate of semantic representations.
The findings of the present study are in agreement with neuroimaging studies showing the involvement of the fusiform gyrus in processing conceptual information (for reviews, see Kanwisher et al., 2001) . Finding that fusiform damage affects semantic knowledge (as in our subjects and in other neuropsychological reports) and that semantic processing activates the fusiform gyrus during fMRI experiments provides strong evidence for the relationship between semantics and the fusiform.
Our lesion data are less consistent with the claim, also based on fMRI evidence, that distinct portions of the fusiform are activated by different object categories. It has been proposed that biological objects (faces, animals) activate the lateral portion of the fusiform more than artefacts (tools), whereas the reverse pattern is observed in the medial portion . In our sample, damage to the middle third of the fusiform (medial portions) impaired biological categories but not inanimate objects (cases WMA and GIZ), with a further gradient between animals (relatively spared) and plant life (case WMA). The discrepancy between our observations and the predictions made on the basis of fMRI evidence might be due to the fact that PCA strokes, like all vascular lesions, are extensive and include, in addition to the fusiform gyrus, other neural structures which may be more critical for biological entities than for non-living entities. However, this account is not entirely convincing. For example, in cases WMA and GIZ only the medial half of the fusiform was damaged. On the basis of fMRI data the prediction would be that left PCA lesions should result in selective impairment of inanimate objects. In contrast with this prediction, WMA and GIZ presented with greater impairment for biological categories than for non-living entities (and for plant life than for animals). Thus, partially contrasting results from lesion and neuroimaging studies cannot be dismissed as artefacts of different localizing methods, and deserve further investigation.
What is the nature of category specificity?
Our observations are relevant for the ongoing discussion about the cognitive nature of category specificity. A first relevant issue concerns whether the disproportionate impairment of biological categories, and especially of plant life, is agnosic, semantic or lexical in nature. Most of our PCA cases fared poorly both on naming and on one or more of the other experimental tasks. An analysis of the patterns of performance observed in our subjects, in the light of the computational demands of our experimental tasks, may shed light on this issue.
The deficit observed on the verbal questionnaire rules out that the deficits observed on naming and on word-picture matching had a purely agnosic origin. Moreover, the questionnaire allows us to explore distinct components of semantic knowledge, contrasting superordinate with subordinate information and perceptual with associative information both between-and within-category. In none of our patients was semantic impairment more severe for perceptual than for associative information. This argues against the claim that a disproportionate loss of perceptual knowledge with respect to associative knowledge causes disproportionate damage to biological categories.
The visual reality judgment was aimed at verifying if subjects retained the ability to activate the structural description system (a cognitive component that represents visual knowledge about the shape of an object) starting from visual input. Previous observations on category-specific deficits reported that the structural description system was defective for biological categories (for a review, see Capitani et al., 2003) . In the present study, based on strictly controlled picture stimuli (see supplementary material), several subjects fared poorly on the reality judgement task (especially after right-sided lesions), but dissociations between biological categories and artefacts were never observed. This observation is consistent with the results of the questionnaire, and confirms the absence of cases with category-specific agnosia in our sample. Therefore, the origin of the category specific disorders presented by our patients was semantic (with the possible exception of WMA, for which an isolated lexical deficit cannot be excluded).
An additional question is whether disproportionate deficits of plant-life knowledge with respect to animals, as observed in CCA, AMA, WMA and SGE, could be accounted for by selective damage to semantic features that characterize plant life. It has been argued that colour knowledge, which is represented in inferior temporal areas Miceli et al., 2001) is crucial for the knowledge of plant-life items (Warrington and McCarthy, 1987) . Consequently, loss of colour knowledge might selectively damage plant-life exemplars. Since, in our experiments, we used black-and-white line drawings, and the questions in our semantic questionnaire never tapped colour information, our experimental tasks do not directly address this issue. However, information about colour perception and colour knowledge was available for three of these subjects (see supplementary material). CCA was normal on the Ishihara test, on colour naming and on word-colour matching. On object-colour verification tasks his performance was borderline or marginally defective, most errors occurring with fruit and vegetable stimuli. In other words, he did not suffer from a generalized impairment of colour knowledge, which could have selectively affected plant-life items. Rather, loss of colour information was restricted to the semantic category for which other aspects of knowledge were disproportionately impaired-plant life. Cases AMA and SGE were normal on all colour tasks. SGE was not willing to cooperate beyond the basic tasks, and this aspect of his performance remains substantially unexplored. These results do not support the hypothesis that selective damage to plant-life knowledge in these patients resulted from an across-the-board impairment of colour perception and colour knowledge, which had greater impact on this than on other categories.
One could ask the same question in the reverse, i.e. whether the disproportionate deficit of plant-life knowledge with respect to animals can be explained by the relative sparing of information characterizing animal knowledge. Our data do not allow us to give a direct answer to this, but possible solutions are provided by neuroimaging studies. A reasonable distinction between the semantic representations of animals and of plant life rests on the fact that biological motion and associations with emotional experience are more typical of animals than of fruits and vegetables. fMRI and PET investigations have shown that watching biological motion activates the superior temporal sulcus (Beauchamps et al., 2002 (Beauchamps et al., , 2003 and the amygdala (Bonda et al., 1996; Martin and Weisberg, 2003; Beauchamps et al., 2003) , which is well known to be linked to emotional experience (Phelps, 2004) . Thus, the superior temporal sulcus and the amygdala appear to be more relevant for representing semantic knowledge about animals than about plant life. Since they receive their blood supply from the middle cerebral artery, which is unaffected in our cases, greater impairment of fruits and vegetables than of animals following damage to the PCA might be due to the disruption of a critical portion of the semantic substrate needed for the representation of plant-life items, in the face of relative sparing of the substrate necessary for the representation of animals.
Conclusion
Our study shows that a disproportionate impairment of biological categories, more marked for plant life, is strongly associated with left PCA strokes. This deficit is semantic and not agnosic in nature, and causes an homogeneous deficit of perceptual and associative information. The semantic deficit for the category of plant life is a genuine cognitive pattern, and does not depend on general severity or on a disproportionate deficit of colour knowledge. Performance in chronic cases shows that this deficit may last unchanged for many years. Lesion data demonstrate that the area crucially and selectively associated to a semantic deficit for plant life is the intermediate portion of the left fusiform gyrus. The comparison of left PCA strokes and HSE cases supports the conclusion that the neural substrates for the semantic representation of plant life and animals do not coincide, and that the left posterior and basal temporal areas are less crucial than the anterior temporal areas for the representation of animal knowledge.
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